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enterprises and the 
internationalization 
of capital in 
Brazilian industry 
Maria da Conceição 
Tavares* 
and Aloísio Teixeira** 
In a careful analytic movement from the general to 
the particular, the authors seek to clarify the complex 
and controversial phenomenon of the international-
ization of capital. In the first part, after briefly re-
viewing the main theories in this area, they charac-
terize the central aspects of postwar capitalist expan-
sion in the centres; this expansion is analysed in 
various stages, beginning with the hegemony of the 
United States immediately after the war, through the 
period of expansion of the subsidiaries of transna-
tional corporations (TNCs) originating from the 
United States, Europe and Japan, continuing with 
the national responses to this 'American challenge' 
and the differentiation among the centres, and cul-
minat ing in the crisis of recent years which is caus-
ing the breakdown of the international order. 
After pointing out the differences in the pro-
cesses of internationalization in the advanced and 
underdeveloped countries, the authors enter into 
the case of the second part of the article, referring to 
two main aspects of the process of internationaliza-
tion in Brazil. On the one hand, and on the basis of 
data obtained from a study of the main transnational 
corporations in this country, they explore the inter-
nationalization of industry; on the other, they analy-
se the external debt, its causes and its consequences 
for the present and future of Brazil. 
In conclusion, they examine the recent general 
t rends in internationalization and its prospects in 
this country, especially with reference to the mineral 
resources and banking sectors, in which they feel 
this process might intensify. 
•Consultant to the CEPAL/CTC Joint Unit on Transna-
tional Corporations and Professor of the Faculty oFEconom-
ics and Administration (FEA) of the Federal University of 
Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) and the Department of Economics 
(DEPE) of the University of Campinas (UNICAMP). 
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The principal divergence behind the de-
bate —and this is true not only for marxists but 
for any other school which accepts histori-
cism— is that there is a separation between the 
blocs of monopolized capital and their national 
origin, which leads to a process of transnation-
alization. The three versions which attempt to 
interpret this fact, and the way the internation-
alization relations are structured, develop out 
of the debates between marxists and neo-
marxists in France. 
The first version —of which Mandel's 
ideas may be taken as typical— continues to 
centre analysis of the international system on 
the emphasis on competition between blocs of 
national capital. The second —which may be 
represented by Bettelheim— proposes the idea 
of an oligopolistic collusion which goes beyond 
national limits and places the weaker nations, 
that is, those of the so-called periphery, in a 
subordinate position. The third seems to aim at 
The veritable plethora of words written in re-
cent years on subjects such as the internation-
alization of capital and of TNCs certainly sheds 
very little light on the matter except, of course, 
for rare and notable exceptions. Furthermore, 
disagreement is often seen even within the 
modern schools of thought which deal with the 
problem. We refer especially to the marxist cur-
rents of thought, the Anglo-American school of 
the theory of international oligopoly and the 
Latin American version originating in CEPAL. 
Still, some progress has .been made, and at 
least the marxist versions now admit that the 
process of internationalization of capital is 
derived from and determined by the movement 
of capitalist competition, which occurs espe-
cially between blocs of capital previously 
monopolized. The differences do not refer, 
then to the origins of monopolization, which 
according to the various schools of thought re-
sulted from the national frameworks of capital-
ist development before the war. All agree that 
the United States of America, Europe and Ja-
pan are the main centres of developed capital-
ism. 
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the formation of a new world economy which 
would be relatively unified but obviously sub-
ordinate (and always according to the proper 
norms of the "unequal and combined devel-
opment of capitalism"). This latter corresponds 
to the Palloix version and may lead, with some 
modifications by Third World attitudes, to a 
resurgence of the central-periphery scheme, 
via approaches which range from unequal ex-
change, according to the cruder version of 
Emmanue l , to accumulation on a world-wide 
scale, according to the more complex version of 
Samir Amin. 
There is no need to point out the ideolo-
gical attraction of the various versions of this 
latter idea, especially when they combine the 
dual attraction of the use of marxist categories 
and the indignation of the exploited peoples of 
the Third World. 
In the Anglo-Saxon school, anticipating 
the marxist debate, the idea of transnational-
ization takes as its point of departure the in-
ternal criticism levelled at the theories of in-
dustrial organization in the very heart of the 
Harvard School of Business Administration. In 
reality, both the conservative vision of Vernon 
and that of his radical disciples, especially 
Hymer, restate the question of the internation-
alization of capital through the expansion of the 
large United States corporations. These points 
of view have already crossed the Atlantic and 
have found supporters such as Rowthorn and 
Caves in the British socialist world. 
Pari passu with the French and Anglo-
Saxon debate on the nature of internationaliza-
tion there is the Latin American debate. De-
rived from Raúl Prebisch's thinking (based on 
the terms of the central-periphery relationship) 
on the unequal development of the capitalist 
system, this has given rise to a series of ideas on 
dependen t development. In reality, this evolu-
tion represents at once a criticism of the per-
verted forms assumed by our types of indus-
trialization in their social aspects and a recogni-
tion of the failure of the autonomous national 
projects of capitalistic development. The works 
of Celso Furtado, Osvaldo Sunkel, Aníbal Pinto 
and Prebisch himself bring out this dual pro-
cess and offer a rich view of the debates men-
tioned. 
In the more sociological version of Cardo-
so and Faletto, the lack of autonomy is the result 
not only of technological dependence due to 
the absence of a developed and autochthonous 
capital goods sector, but especially of the inter-
nal connexions of the national dominant classes 
with the interests of international capitalism. 
This leads to a patently concentrated model, in 
terms of economic and political power, which 
emphasizes the historical characteristics of the 
exclusion and marginalization of broad strata of 
the population. 
In Aníbal Pinto's non-'dependentist '* ver-
sion, the specificity derives not only from eco-
nomic and political concentration —recog-
nized as a general characteristic of capitalism— 
but also from certain structural characteristics 
of the Latin American development style. 
These lead to an aggravation of structural het-
erogeneity, resulting in non-generalization of 
the so-called 'fruits of technical progress' to the 
majority of the population.1 
These ideas do not attribute the aggrava-
tion of inequalities to the unequal endowment 
with factors in the face of inadequate techno-
logies, as in the neoclassical perspective,2 nor 
to over-exploitation of the periphery by the 
centre, as in the neomarxist view.3 
Instead, according to the more complex 
'dependent is t ' ideas, the aggravation of in-
equalities is a result, above all, of the effects of 
internationalization on the development of the 
social relationships of domination, and is all the 
more powerful the more developed are the cap-
italist productive forces, forming the so-called 
'internationalization of the internal market'. 
The most recent CEPAL conception of 
Latin American industrialization, to be seen in 
the work of Fernando Fajnzylber, explicitly 
incorporates elements of the theory of the oli-
gopoly,4 resulting, however, in its later evolu-
*Neologism referring to the so-called "theory of de-
pendence" . 
^ e e A. Pinto, "Heterogeneidade estrutural e modelo 
de desenvolvimento recente", in J. Serra (éd.), América 
Latina - Ensaios de Interpretação Económica, Rio de Ja-
neiro, Ed. Paz e Terra, second edition, 1979. 
2For a critique of the neoclassical view, see J. Serra, op. 
cit. 
3 For a critique of the neomarxist conception, see F.H. 
Cardoso and J. Serra, "As desventuras da dialética da de-
pendencia" , in Estudos CEBRAP, São Paulo, No. 23. 
4CEPAL, "The expansion of international enterprises 
and their influence on development in Latin America", 
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tion, in very different points of view on the 
nature of the processes at work. The various 
points of view include positions ranging from 
reaffirming the need for national industrializa-
tion centered on the formation of an "endoge-
nous nucleus of technological dynamization" 
(Fajnzylber), via the idea of postnational capi-
talism and the criticism of the myths of devel-
opment (Celso Furtado), to postulating the 
need for a socialist society (Pedro Vuskovic and 
Raúl Prebisch himself). 
In the present work we will attempt to 
examine the process of internationalization 
since the war in accordance with the evolution 
of a manufacturing system based on United 
States industrial organization and supported by 
an international financial and commercial sys-
tem controlled initially by the hegemonistic 
power. The contradictory evolution of this pro-
cess leads, on the one hand, to the spread of the 
United States manufacturing pattern to a cer-
tain number of Third World countries and, on 
the other, to the progressive loss of United 
States hegemony. Therefore, it is not enough to 
use structural methods of analysis to compare 
developed and underdeveloped structures, 
since they do not reproduce at the theoretical 
level the process of internationalization. In 
addition, we consider clearly inadequate the 
attempts of certain authors to reorder the criti-
cisms of capitalism by simply inserting the cat-
egory of transnational corporations (TNCs) as if 
these were responsible for all the imbalances 
and inequalities of the whole system. In the 
final analysis, what they are doing is trans-
forming the TNC into a sort of entelechy, at-
tr ibuting to it whatever was clasically charac-
teristic of capitalism, and merely repeating 
everything that has already been said. In reali-
ty, the process of postwar internationalization 
has had the special feature of generating a more 
rapid expansion and a closer solidarity of the 
system as a whole, weaving the famous web of 
in terdependence , which only makes more vi-
sible and complex the problems presented by 
capitalism from its very inception. 
Economic Survey of Latin America, 1970, Santiago, Chile, 
1971. 
1. The postwar movement of capitalist 
expansion. Central aspects 
Under all the dust raised by the above-
mentioned debate, there is more truth than may 
be obvious. Discovering it and incorporating 
the central explanatory elements of the various 
opposing currents is a sine qua non condition 
for capturing the essential aspects of the 
process of internationalization. 
For this purpose, it is important to distin-
guish two fundamental aspects: 
— firstly the generalization of the United 
States manufacturing pattern due to the hege-
mony of this country; this process reproduces 
the same industrial structure, with all its 
characteristics of industrial organization, and 
the same sectors and leading growth firms in 
the various national markets (the Japanese ex-
ception only applies in the case of enterprises, 
not sectors); 
— secondly the response to capitalistic 
competition, due to the resurgence of the mo-
nopolistic power of the two main defeated 
countries, as a means of facing the threat 
represented by the bloc of socialist countries, 
particularly the Soviet Union and China; 
any difference there may be between the 
various national responses is due to purely 
morphological aspects of the constitution of the 
blocs of capital and to the role of the State in the 
relationship between these and the preserva-
tion of each national accumulation space. 
The process of internationalization thus 
corresponds to modifications made within the 
capitalist system through a realignment, first 
commercial, later manufacturing and techno-
logical and finally financial, of the relative 
positions of the principal developed national 
capitalist countries, that is, a realignment of the 
centres. During this process the United States 
went from an indisputable position of hege-
mony on the commercial, industrial, financial, 
technological and military (and —why not ad-
mit it?— moral) levels to a situation in which it 
found itself obliged to concede to the two-na-
tions most strategically situated in the cold war 
a growing autonomy in relation to its leading 
role as a hegemonistic power. 
The moving force of the process of inter-
nationalization was the dynamic effect of the 
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great industrial and financial capital. It was the 
efficiency of capitalist competition, the search 
for new markets and the national responses 
which reinforce capitalistic ties which led, 
within the system, first to the displacement of 
capital from the United States to the European 
countries, and then from the central countries 
as a whole towards the peripheral world. 
In this second process two patterns may be 
dist inguished: that of industrialization through 
the establishment of affiliate companies of the 
large transnational corporations in markets of 
considerable absolute size, confirming and 
emphasizing the preexisting industrial devel-
opment ; and the case of the so-called 'export 
platforms', which occurred at the end of 
the process of industrial expansion through 
affiliates after exhausting the dynamic possi-
bili t ies of inter-eentre expansion, in a kind of 
revived caricature of the theory of comparative 
advantages. Only in this last stage did the most 
apparent tendencies of the new system become 
evident , after the latter had already reached 
a level of interindustrial and financial 
interpénétration which was to lead Bettelheim 
to call it 'oligopolistic collusion'. 
Superimposed on this movement of dif-
ferentiated expansion of capitalistic interna-
tionalization, special cases of industrialization 
stand out, deliberately supported by the eco-
nomic and military might of the United States 
in frankly backward countries, without a great 
market potential but located on the strategic 
border of the system, such as Iran, South Korea 
and Taiwan. In the first two, puppets to begin 
with, the response of the national States to a 
growing autonomization led to a de stabilization 
of the proposed imperial model, which was 
merely the latest in the demonstrations of loss 
of hegemony. 
This entire process, complex by nature and 
differentiated by its dynamics, has been 
approached with simplistic ideas which im-
p e d e its proper comprehension. It is a wrong 
and absolutely empty generalization to 
catagorize this 'general movement of extended 
reproduction on a world scale' as a search for 
cheap labour, as various neomarxist thinkers 
have done. 
T h e important point for our purposes is to 
stress once again that, rather than the formation 
of a transnationalized world economy which 
would tend towards the harmonious and effi-
cient operation of a system of large enter-
prises, capable of imposing a transnational 
economic order per se, what happened was a 
destructuring of the system of capitalist power 
buttressed by the United States hegemony. 
This destructuring reveals, paradoxically, a 
dual impotence: 
— The subsystem of industrial and, more 
recently, banking affiliates is so interconnected 
and has such rapid oligopolistic reactions in the 
market that it is capable of proceeding to an 
international redivision of labour within the 
enterprise (bloc of capital). By developing 
through the orbits of production and circulation 
of merchandise and circulation of financial 
capital, it is able to manoeuvre beyond the 
limits of the national economic spaces and 
outside the control of the economic policies of 
their respective governments. This slows 
down, or even makes impossible, strictly na-
tional solutions for structural readjustment of 
the system, or rather impedes the classical 
imperialist solution of resolving capitalistic 
disputes through rivalries or wars between 
national powers. I t is not enough, therefore, 
to insist, as Mandei does, on the eminently 
national character of the capital blocs in 
competition; 
— Nor is the transnational hope of a new 
order based on the affilliated and inter-
dependen t subsystem valid either, because in 
reality what is involved is merely a formal 
subsystem. The capital blocs which serve the 
interests of private enterprise cannot stop 
competing among themselves and reproducing 
on a broader scale, i.e., at the world-wide level, 
the disorder of capitalistic laissez-faire. The 
present desperate search for a conservative, 
neo-liberal ideology which takes away from na-
tional States, including even the hegemonistic 
powers, their minimal capacity for regulation 
and which blames the State for all the setbacks 
(from the fiscal crisis to the bureaucratic 
and moral crisis) in the path towards the new 
order, is the best possible demonstration of 
'transnational impotence'. Everything appears 
to indicate that the big international bankers 
and businessmen would welcome the estab-
lishment, on the part of the 'invisible hand' 
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of the merchandise kingdom, of a new order 
without a visible res publica, beginning with 
the absence of an international monetary pat-
tern, with denomination in dollars, of the great 
international banks, except for inter-bank 
accounting. 
T h e most clearly schizophrenic manifes-
tation of this dual impotence becomes evident 
in the demands made by spokesmen of the 
large enterprises for localized intervention by 
the State in markets which are in crisis. In 
demanding the imposition of barriers and the 
socialization of losses through subsidies and 
tax reductions, they are not ashamed to enter 
into conflict with their own requirement of 
applying liberal principles in other markets. 
2. Periods and national responses 
For a complete understanding of the process 
of internationalization, we must develop its 
analysis through the four stages in which the 
world economy expanded after the war. The 
first corresponds to the period of complete he-
gemony by the United States, from European 
reconstruction until 1955-1958; from then until 
the mid-1970s came the period of expansion of 
affiliates of the large enterprises originating in 
the United States and the national responses to 
the 'American challenge'; the following period, 
which ended around 1974, may be called global 
transnationalization, when the 'hegemony cri-
sis' of the United States and the differentiation 
of the centres took place; finally, and up until 
the present, we have the evolution of the crisis 
provoked by the general breakdown of the in-
ternational order. 
The first stage, which corresponds to 
the predominance of the United States in the 
commercial and financial spheres, starts with 
the implantation of a system of rules of 
operation of the international market, through 
institutions such as GATT, IMF or IBRD, 
which ensured their orderly development 
under the auspices of the dollar system. In this 
per iod the structural elements of the internal 
response by the main countries affected by the 
war began to appear, with the following main 
characteristics: 
— State support for reconstruction, al-
though resorting to external indebtedness; 
— monopolistic re-linking of industrial 
and banking capital, and adaptation of the old 
national structures to the technological and 
market patterns of the large United States 
corporation; 
— trade aggressiveness, especially that of 
Germany towards the rest of Europe and Japan 
towards the Asiatic world, and even towards 
the United States. 
This Japanese and German trade aggres-
siveness brought with it a decrease in the par-
ticipation of the United States in world trade, a 
fact which was already manifest at the begin-
ning of the 1970s. However, this country still 
maintained its industrial and technological 
hegemony, and used its power especially in the 
fields of agriculture and finance. 
As regards the pattern of expansion of the 
United States affiliates, they maintained their 
traditional interest in strategic mineral re-
sources and the opening of affiliates interested 
in the processes of export and import in order to 
control markets through the habitual practices 
of using patents, 'tied' financing, etc. There 
was still no generalization of the manufacturing 
'affiliatization' which was to flourish after 
overcoming the regional or national tariff bar-
riers with the implantation of new productive 
units. 
The pax americana, expressed by the po-
litical and military hegemony of the United 
States and the remilitarization of the so-called 
Western world under the atomic 'umbrella', 
left the capitalist countries, especially the 
developed ones, free to carry out the tasks of 
economic reconstruction, technological diver-
sification and regrouping of essentially eco-
nomic forces. France is the only traditional 
European country which attempted to main-
tain a relative autonomy on all fronts without 
submission, even manifesting some degree of 
rebell ion in relation to NATO itself. Japan 
maintained its nationalism on the economic 
level, but politically and militarily it remained 
under the aegis of the United States. England, 
now a minor partner, did not adhere to the 
European policy. 
In 1954 the consolidation of this imperial 
system culminated with the United States in-
tervention in the Middle East and Indochina. 
However, whereas in the Middle East the 
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United States military policy was based on the 
concrete interests of the advanced capitalist 
system because it guaranteed a cheap supply of 
oil, in the Far East it was only a substitute for 
the old colonial order. The reverses suffered on 
the political and military levels, and later on 
the moral level with the defeat in Vietnam, are 
all too well known. On the economic level, the 
greatest beneficiary of thé United States mili-
tary policy in the Far East was Japan. The 
commercial and technological expansion of 
Japan in the region resulted in the subsequent 
industrial expansion of Japanese affiliates: a 
process which is, on a smaller scale, the coun-
terpart of the expansion of the United States 
manufacturing affiliates in Europe. 
The second stage, which began in the mid-
1950s and extended for a period of almost 10 
years, was the so-called 'American challenge', 
that is, the intensification of inter-capitalist 
competition under the United States hegemo-
ny. T h e expansion of United States affiliates, 
which followed the previous stage of merchan-
dise export and financial indebtedness of the 
rest of the world with the United States, 
deve loped under European regional neo-
protectionism, which hoisted the flag of 
neoliberalism. 
The organization of a European system of 
payments was based on military expenditures 
and the flight of capital in dollars, which 
reproduced at the European level the intra-
regional, neoliberal ordering of a trade pat-
tern, a manufacturing system and a banking 
subsystem. The simultaneous movement of 
European financial capital, especially banking 
capital, was inextricably linked with the cy-
clical movement of the United States national 
economy, which found in the European sub-
system a mechanism for the extended repro-
duction of its surpluses of private capital. The 
issue of dollars by the Federal Reserve Bank, 
encouraged periodically by the United States 
fiscal and balance-of-payments déficits, served 
as a 'monetary base' for the concomitant 
extended expansion of the means of payment 
and interbank credit in the European Common 
Market. 
All these factors, although they reinforced 
the greater industrial and commercial dyna-
mism of Europe, were perceived on the politi-
cal and ideological level as an expression of the 
United States hegemony, and the expression 
'American challenge' was coined. Actually, 
however, the so-called 'American challenge' 
already contained the response which would 
br ing about the commercial, industrial and fi-
nancial defeat of the United States national 
power. The strong intercapital i st competition 
which existed in each national European space 
exerted pressure in the direction of dynamic 
responses from the national capital interests, 
both private and State, in close connexion with 
the large national banks. Only later, after the 
transmigration of the United States banking af-
filiates, could the European affiliates of the 
important enterprises of this country take ad-
vantage of the complete regionalized circuit of 
integrated financial capital. 
The single and obvious exception is 
England, which continued to pay the price 
implied in its role as minor partner and second-
ary financial centre, although still proud of its 
liberal traditions and mercantile, financial and 
diplomatic savoir faire. The British banking 
system, in maintaining prima facie its inter-
national role, did not support the industrial 
modernization of the country, and this led to 
a process of denationalization of those great 
British enterprises which were not either in the 
weak position of being 'nationalized' (by the 
British State) or in the strong position of being 
already transnational i zed. 
On the other hand, on the Continent the 
process of internationalization was influenced 
by the strong oligopolistic modernization and 
linkage of national capital in competitive or 
associated coexistence with the large capital 
from the United States, under the tutelary 
protection of the State, whatever the ideology 
(frequently neoliberal) of the governing 
parties. 
Until the mid-1960s intercapital i stic com-
petit ion, provoked by the movement and artic-
ulation of an oligopolistic interplay with a na-
tional base, although increasingly internation-
alized, made possible the strengthening of a 
properly international order which, although it 
affirmed interdependence on the commercial 
and financial levels, simultaneously gave very 
dynamic industrial responses in the specifical-
ly European space (for example, not only the 
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German miracle but also the French and Italian 
national miracles). 
It is clear that the particularly dynamic and 
innovative performance of Japan allowed this 
country to make up for lost time and overcome 
its famous technological dualism, fully entering 
the mass consumption market which had been 
reached long before the war by the developed 
European countries. However, it may be 
observed that even the Europeans generalized 
a particular form of consumption —that of 
durable goods— which is a dynamic resource 
in expanding the internal market already 
saturated by the United States economy 
immediately after the war. 
Thus, the industrialization patterns of the 
1960s were very similar in all countries of 
the world, with the advantage that the durable 
consumer goods sector played an additional 
motivating role in the development of the 
metal manufactures and machinery support 
industries. In the United States, on the other 
hand, a much more mature economy whose 
consumer market showed purely vegetative 
growth, the only dynamic force lay in the ar-
maments industry. This, however, despite 
complex and heavy technological develop-
ment , shows very limited chain reactions and 
interindustrial impact. 
The third stage corresponds to the global 
trans nationalization of the subsystem of af-
filiates and also marks the advent of the hege-
mony crisis of United States national power. 
T h e United States, to be sure, maintained 
its indisputable technological and market 
power, especially in the sectors where it was 
traditionally strong: heavy and mass-produced 
equ ipmen t and agriculture. Nevertheless, 
although this buttressed its great potential for 
accumulation, it did not resolve the problem 
of interindustrial expansion nor that of the 
markets outside of industry. It may be noted in 
passing that this was the source of its inexora-
b le vocation to expand beyond the frontiers of 
its national market which, in spite of being 
colossal, had the inertia corresponding to its 
own hugeness. Expansion towards the outside 
by the affiliate subsystems was extremely 
beneficial to the dynamism of the United States 
national economy itself, both for the circuits of 
head office-afíiliate exports and for the demand 
on its powerful agriculture and food industries 
by the rest of the world. 
However, the oligopolistic response was 
not long in coming, especially in the shape of 
European and Japanese competition, and the 
actual process of expansion of affiliates and 
trans nationalization of capital from those 
countries cut down the specifically United 
States economic space. Before the end of the 
1960s and, especially, after 1968, with 
the United States crisis in evidence and well-
developed in its commercial, fiscal and even 
military aspects, the trans nationalization of the 
capitalist system and the progressive loss of 
the national United States hegemony was 
confirmed. 
The system also began, and for good rea-
sons, to lose the regulatory mechanisms built 
u p by the hegemony itself. T h e permanent 
aggravation of the United States deficit pre-
vented the dollar system from maintaining its 
power to structure commercial and financial 
movements . The attempt to maintain the dollar 
artificially as a money system, through its 
growing overvaluation, emphasized the loss of 
natural competition in the bulk of United States 
industry compared with European and Japa-
nese recently installed, modernized and 
dynamic industries, further stimulated by the 
very competition unleashed by the United 
States affiliates. These, although on an equal 
level of modernization, could not compete with 
the heavy and important national segments of 
heavy industry from which they had originally 
come, bu t they obliged the rest with whom they 
competed, sometimes even their own partners, 
to win the combat of international competition. 
T h e crisis in the United States national 
economy continued to worsen in structural 
terms, and the loss of ability to compete, the 
fiscal deficit and balance-of-payments déficits 
are only the most obvious manifestations of 
this. The United States' rate of accumulation at 
the beginning of the mini-boom in the world 
economy from 1970 to 1972 was frankly inferior 
not only to that of the subsystem of affiliates 
—indeed, it always had been— but also to its 
own historical postwar rate. Moreover, the 
subsystem of United States affiliates expanded 
more slowly, after the mid-1960s, than the 
whole of European and Japanese affiliates in 
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the world. Or rather, the United States system 
as a whole lost momentum. 
The periodical recoveries in the growth of 
the United States national economy led to a 
worsening of the deficit. The stop-and-go 
policies, which responded to the alternating 
movements of the balance of payments and the 
flow of capital, pressured the dollar in the 
exchange markets, and in 1971 the dollar 
system, symbol of United States hegemony, 
collapsed along with the entire Bretton Woods 
system. To a considerable extent this was due 
to the speculation stimulated by the United 
States affiliates themselves in the Euro-
currency markets, which reacted against the 
currency of their own country of origin. 
The fourth stage occurred from 1974 until 
t he present , and has witnessed the decay of the 
old economic order and the attempts, up to now 
fruitless, to cure it. The oil crisis actually only 
accentuated the structural nature of the prob-
lem of the internationalization of capital by 
br inging out a weakness in the infrastructure of 
the world manufacturing technological system 
not unrelated to the imperial character of the 
predominant economic order. 
T h e intercapitalist rivalry, sorely tried by 
the forced union of interests and without a uni-
fied command at any level, could not hide the 
ruptures and disturbances of the national 
power structures which did not yield easily to 
the Utopian or self-interested pretensions of the 
transnational ideology. The ideological differ-
ences themselves within the capitalist system 
have steadily increased in recent decades and 
have generated attitudes which are frankly un-
favourable to that system from the traditional 
pillars of the oldest Western secular order, such 
as the national armies and the Catholic Church. 
However, the transnational ideology has 
stood by its 'pacificist' utopias: North-South 
integration and East-West convergence. Such 
schemes, of markedly ideological origin, re-
duce and simplify the multipolarization of the 
existing political and economic forces and ig-
nore the structural movements characteristic of 
each bloc of countries. 
T h e socialist countries, especially the 
Soviet Union and China, are much less hetero-
geneous societies and are only now beginning 
to enter upon patterns of production and con-
sumption; to them, the United States type of 
internationalization of the industrial system is 
at the very least, quite foreign. The transna-
tionalizing aspiration of the large capital enter-
prises, which would like to penetrate deep into 
the potentially huge markets of these two 
nations, runs up against at least three types of 
obstacles: 
— the non-existence of capitalist competi-
tion, which is the dynamic and disseminatory 
instrument, par excellence, of the forms of 
' technical progress', and especially their most 
polished form: product differentiation; 
— the very form, not only of basic social 
relations of production, but especially of the 
way in which the national division of labour is 
articulated and its position outside the inter-
national division (which has not advanced suf-
ficiently, even within the socialist bloc itself); 
— the modus operandi of the large Soviet 
(and Chinese) conglomerates or State enter-
prises, which do not have any structural simi-
larity to the internationalized enterprises, 
ei ther in their intersectoral relations or in the 
form in which the process of labour is orga-
nized, to say nothing of the most obvious fea-
ture, which is the centrally-planned control of 
the economy. 
Consequently, the famous interpénétration 
of the two systems is no more than a fantastic 
idea which does not even point towards a clear 
ideological convergence, and even less a global 
transnational izatioh of the world under the 
aegis of an ultramodern type of financial neo-
mercantilism. 
From the point of view of North-South re-
lations, or rather of relations between the so-
called centre and periphery, the limits of trans-
nationalization are less evident, but are none-
theless strict. The existence of the NICs (newly 
industrializing countries), celebrated in prose 
and Verse as an industrial conquest of transna-
tionalization, hides some obvious problems of 
structural analysis: 
1. The pattern of production and consump-
tion reproduced in the periphery excludes, not 
only as citizens but also even as consumers, 
huge masses of the population who, although 
incorporated into the most modern mercantile 
relations, and thus subject to the dominant 
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mode of production, are only second-class con-
sumers. 
2. The degree of development of the speci-
fically capitalistic productive forces of these 
countries is much more advanced than their 
position in world trade, which is low, or their 
position in international financial indebted-
ness, which is considerable. This makes even 
less problematic the possibility of a reproduc-
tion on a world scale compatible with the old 
order or even, let it be said in passing, with any 
foreseeable new order (since the imaginable 
has been formulated since 1964 by UNCTAD 
without any perceptible results). If this trend 
continues, the renationalization of the indus-
trial, commercial and financial structures 
which are today trans nationalized would ap-
pear as a sine qua non condition requiring, at 
least for some countries, the adherence and 
peaceful (or authoritarian) transition of the 
large enterprises to the interests of the national 
host States. 
3. As the oligopolistic balance cannot be 
reestablished at the level of the central coun-
tries without the return to the country of origin 
of much 'affiliatized'* capital duly associated 
with international capital from different na-
tions, the most plausible alternative remains 
the sterilization of the considerable masses of 
financial capital corresponding to unrecov-
erable debts , beginning with the debt of the 
United States itself. Without this prior clean-
ing-up, and quite apart from any considerations 
regarding rivalry or the possibilities of inter-
capitalistic collusion, it is difficult to image a 
reordering of the international system, even if, 
as is most probable, a broad North-South re-
gionalization is maintained as a result of the 
historic relations of domination. 
3. Differences between the process of 
internationalization in advances and 
underdeveloped countries 
Immediately after the war the United States 
economy was highly 'trustified', with a great 
concentration of financial capital which could 
*Neologism from "affiliate" that is, "establisment 
which depends on another". 
not all be reinvested in the 'trustified' industry 
itself; hence the need to expand abroad. The 
first attempt was that of dismantling the mono-
polistic structure of the defeated countries and 
using their exports of merchandise and tech-
nology to finance the United States hegemony 
in the areas which were already industrialized. 
This was of short duration, and the neoliberal 
model of the imitative reproduction of United 
States financial institutions and the breaking 
down of the large enterprises and large rival 
banks gave way to a process of monopolistic 
restructuring which took place under the aegis 
of domestic economic policies. 
The process of internationalization was 
then carried out through the spread of the large 
United States enterprise, and it found resis-
tance which was neither passive nor only on 
the part of the market but which was reflected 
in the institutional restructuring and reorgani-
zation of the great blocs of domestic capital. It 
was only after this that the oligopolistic reac-
tion mentioned by the United States school 
took place: that is, a reactive behaviour whose 
typical features were aggresive expansion of 
markets, product differentiation, and special-
ization in the most advantageous commercial 
branches within each industrial sector. 
The expanding sectors were the same 
everywhere: basically metal manufactures and 
machinery, the electrical and electronics in-
dustries and the chemical industry. It was in 
these sectors associated with national banking 
capital that the remonopolization of capital was 
carried out, although no longer in the old form 
of the German cartel or Japanese zaibatsu; the 
form adopted from the business conglomerates 
turned out to be more flexible than the old 
prewar heavy industry and mining cartels. 
Thus, it is not just any kind of oligopoly 
that is in question, but the form which Labini 
called 'differentiated-concentrated oligopoly'. 
The concentration lies more in the financial 
power of conglomeration and differentiated 
penetration into various markets than in the 
individualized participation of each enterprise 
in each particular market.5 
5This explains the fact that the indexes of industrial 
concentration, as measured by the participation of the four 
major four-digit establishments, are practically identical in 
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In the developing countries the situation is 
radically different. The process of industrial 
monopolization is very backward in the indus-
trial sectors established before transnational-
ization, so that in the majority of cases the en-
trance of transnational manufacturing enter-
prises took place at the same time as the consti-
tution of the productive sectors which form the 
technical base and the market itself. The pre-
existing forms of consumption were limited to 
the élites, who imported durable consumer 
goods and a small variety of capital goods to 
maintain the national infrastructure. Thus, the 
so-called 'internationalization of the domestic 
market ' suddenly created the enterprises, in-
dustries and markets, that is, the specifically 
capitalistic productive forces corresponding to 
an advanced stage of world capitalism. 
Much more than a substitution of a ridicu-
lously small amount of imports or a non-exis-
tent mass market, this process of 'affiliatization' 
requires , in order to be effective, that the in-
dustry should be a market for itself to a much 
greater extent than it already is by nature. This 
leads to a successive internationalization of the 
various productive stages within each indus-
try,6 with a concomitant expansion of pre-
existing national capital and a voluntary or 
forced articulation, promoted by the State, of 
the various segments of capital. 
Actually, rather than rivalry and competi-
tion in the struggle for pre-existing markets, we 
are witnessing the creation of new economic 
spaces which include all the types of national 
capital, large and small, and international cap-
ital from various sources, without apparent 
serious rivalries. Thus, in our opinion, the con-
cept of 'entrance barriers' does not apply to 
international, national or State capital when it 
is a question of the installation of the new in-
dustrial structures for durable consumer goods, 
heavy inputs or capital goods. The implanta-
tion of these new sectors took place under the 
leadership of the international affiliates, with 
all countries, which shows an apparent homogeneity of the 
oligopolistic structure at the world scale. 
6 T h e concept of the 'product cycle', formulated by 
Vernon, describes only the form of this process without 
capturing its essence, which is expressed by the idea of the 
total capital cycle. 
the direct support of the State, and the toler-
ance, if not the association, of national private 
interests. It is paradoxical that the protection-
ism motivated by the balance-of-payments 
crisis did not create entrance barriers but stim-
uli, which were fed back through the intersec-
toral dynamic system itself during the periods 
of joint expansion, giving rise to a special type 
of briefer and more intense cycles than the 
Schumpetarian cycles of diffusion of innova-
tions. 
In the few cases where some large blocs of 
national industrial capital existed before, the 
barriers to the entrance of capital did function, 
supported even by the political power of the 
State. This was the case of the group in the 
heavy metallurgy industry, civil construction 
and construction materials, which were not 
denationalized even during periods of crisis. 
Citing the examples of the few existing national 
enterprises in the spheres of electrical equip-
ment and the automobile industry as cases of 
denationalization does not strengthen the ar-
gument at all, since however original or tech-
nologically adequate these enterprises were 
for the reduced national markets, they did not 
have the technological and financial charac-
teristics —that is, the degree of previous mono-
polization— to guarantee them a scale big 
enough to allow them to construct a barrier 
against the entrance of capital. 
The preceding observations refer to the 
phenomenon of simultaneous implantation 
corresponding to the process of recent interna-
tionalization. Completely different, however, 
are the problems of denationalization through 
take-over corresponding to the classical cases 
of export of capital, which are aggravated in 
national economies during periods of crisis 
connected with the end of boom phases in the 
central economies, when there are capital sur-
pluses; this process occurred with the pharma-
ceutical, food, beverage, textile and footwear 
industries, and in general, all the traditional 
industries where international affiliates ex-
isted in open competition with national enter-
prises. However, even in this case, we cannot 
spead of 'entrance barriers', since what 
operated was the relative advantage of the 
special affiliate-parent company relations with 
regard to very low financial costs, brands, tech-
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nology and marketing, which made the domi-
nation of the national markets easier for them. 
Spurred on by the presence of the affiliates 
of the large enterprises, the national enter-
prises were obliged to take the path of defen-
sive modernization. This process of moderniza-
tion necessarily implied the use of techniques 
which required high capital density, bringing 
with it a rapid growth in the capital/labour re-
lationship which became generalized in the 
entire industrial sector. If they did not act in 
this way, the national enterprises would be-
come even more vulnerable to the competition 
from the TNCs. The effects of this phenome-
non were already analysed by Fajnzylber,7 who 
demonstrates that the problem does not lie in 
the fact that the TNCs have contributed less 
than domestic enterprises to the growth of 
employment , "but in the fact that the indus-
trialization model which they advocate incor-
porates structural factors which militate against 
the growth of employment"? 
U p to now we have seen the process of indus-
trialization as a movement articulated from the 
centres of the capitalist system and carried out 
through the implantation of affiliates of the 
great enterprises, at first from the United States 
and later from Europe and Japan. This move-
ment , which generalized the United States' 
manufacturing system and was based on a trade 
and financial pattern controlled by the imperial 
power, cannot be understood in strictly eco-
nomic terms; its understanding requires a 
study of the conditions in which what we call 
the United States hegemony was formed and an 
examination of the various factors which con-
tr ibuted to this hegemony's entering a period of 
crisis. 
7 See Fajnzylber, "Oligopólio, empresas transnacio-
nais e estilos de desenvolvimento", in Estudos CEBRAP, 
No. 18. 
8 F . Fajnzylber, op. cit., p. 26. 
The process tends to reach its culmination 
with financial internationalization. It is here 
that the problem of the new stage remains to be 
solved. In the mid-1960s, when the financial 
reforms of capital markets and of housing fi-
nancing systems became generalized, 'affilia-
tization' occurred only in countries where 
large-scale national banking and mercantile 
capital was not previously installed. Where it 
did exist, and whatever the nature of the laws 
(as different as those in Argentina, Mexico or 
Brazil), national predominance was main-
tained in the construction and banking sector 
with the explicit support of the central banks, 
however orthodox and liberal they were in 
their monetary and financial policies. There 
were also sectors, such as that of strategic 
mineral reserves, in contrast, where a process 
of renationalization did take place after the war. 
It is precisely these sectors —mining, construc-
tion and banking— which are now under attack 
by the new internationalizing liberal ideology. 
But it is another matter to see this same 
movement from the angle of the peripheral 
countries such as Brazil. In our case, the 
meaning of the term 'internationalization' 
corresponds, lato sensu, to the process of the 
implantation of affiliâtes of foreign entreprises, 
giving rise to situations of integration and 
y In this section and the following ones, liberal use will 
be made of the thesis Ciclo e crise - O movimento recente 
da industrialização brasileira, submitted by María da 
Conceição Tavares to the Faculty of Economics and Admi-
nistration of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro in 
applying for the post of full professor. The empirical mate-
rial used is based on the research on industrial structure 
and leading enterprises carried out in FINEP (Fund for the 
financing of studies and projects) by the economists Luiz 
Otávio Façanha and Mário Possas, and on the research on 
TNCs in the Brazilian economy carried out in the Institute 
of Industrial Economics of the Federal University of Rio de 
Janeiro by the economist Reinaldo Gonçalves, both under 
the guidance of Maria da Conceição Tavares. We also wish 
to thank Luiz Otávio Façanha and Reinaldo Gonçalvez for 
their suggestions in the drafting of this work. 
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complementari ty with domestic private or pub-
lic corporations without necessarily meaning 
their expulsion. 
Thus, the term 'denationalization' remains 
l imited to those cases ofthe purchase or failure 
of national enterprises which occur in the 
phase o f the cycle in which the predominance 
of foreign capital is exercised in open compe-
tition with domestic capital. When this occurs 
we have a phenomenon of absolute denation-
alization, which may be distinguished from the 
modalit ies of relative denationalization. This 
took place in stages of rapid expansion or ac-
celerated modernization, whether through rel-
ative concentration in favour of the foreign 
enterprises, due to their greater power of inter-
nal accumulation, or through the influx of new 
capital to achieve a technological leap forward 
(as occurred in the synthetic textile industry), 
or through significant economies in horizontal 
and vertical market integration (as happened in 
various branches of the chemical, pharmaceu-
tical and cosmetics industries). 
In this broad sense the Brazilian economy 
has undergone processes of internationaliza-
tion which are not limited to recent decades, 
w h e n it has been presented as a domestic 
counterpart of the more general process of 
rearticulation of the international capitalist 
system since the end of the war. The peculiar 
feature of this period, however, is that it creates 
a convergent logic of accumulation in which 
publ ic investment (particularly in the infra-
structure and in the production of basic inputs) 
becomes subordinate to investment by interna-
tional enterprises, and both carry national pri-
vate investment with them in their career. 
If we take into account only the processing 
industries, we may see that the process ofinter-
nationalization is old and has accompanied 
almost all the stages of industrialization since 
the 1920s. T h e recent period of expansion, 
which has confirmed the trends already out-
l ined since the mid-1950s, extended interna-
tionalization to all brances of industry, partic-
ularly in the case ofthe large enterprises which 
dominate the principal industrial markets. 
1. Presence ofTNCs in Brazilian industry 
T h e data from a study carried out in FINEP, 
which covers only a sample of the leading 
enterprises in the processing industry, show 
the degree of internationalization of the Bra-
zilian industrial structure, which is manifested 
in oligopolistic control ofthe principal markets 
of the processing industry. The analysis starts 
from a sample of the four biggest establish-
ments according to the four-digit industrial 
classification of the Brazilian Institute of Geo-
graphy and Statistics (IBGE), the only standard 
classification of industry which approximates 
(although not totally satisfactorily) to the mar-
ket concept.10 This group includes 1 528 esta-
bl ishments belonging to 1 261 leading enter-
prises and corresponds to 38% of the value of 
production in 1970. 
The participation of foreign capital is 50% 
ofthe value of production ofthe sample, and of 
the rest 33% corresponds to national enter-
prises and 17% to establishments of public-
enterprises. If we limit ourselves to the 272 
large leading enterprises which figure among 
the 500 largest mentioned by the review Visão, 
we note that 149 belong to groups of external 
capital, 110 to national groups and 13 to public 
enterprises. The overall weight of these 272 
enterprises amounts to 30% ofthe total value of 
production, revealing a high level of concen-
tration similar to the international indexes of 
the mature industries in the central countries. 
The proportions of market control are subs-
tantially modified when we consider a sample 
including only the large enterprises, in which 
the groups of foreign capital come to represent 
57% of the value of production of the esta-
bl ishment of large enterprises, while the sub-
groups of public and private domestic capital 
enterprises account for 2 1 % each. 
In order to distinguish between the va-
rious forms of foreign-capital enterprises, the 
research group of F INEP adopted a four-part 
subdivision, as follows; 
— International enterprises, where at least 
20% ofthe capital belongs directly or indirectly 
to a foreign-based enterprise or industrial 
group which figures on the list of the 500 
1 0For methodological considerations on the coverage 
of the sample and the principal concepts used in the analy-
sis, see the master's thesis submitted by professor Mário 
Possas of the University of Campinas. 
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largest enterprises in the United States, or the 
200 largest outside the United States (publish-
ed by the magazine Fortune in 1970), or which 
carry on industrial activities in at least six 
countries; 
— Foreign enterprises, where at least 20% 
of the capital is controlled by a foreign-based 
enterprise or group which does not satisfy any 
of the previously mentioned conditions; 
— Financial conglomerate enterprises, 
when at least 25% of the capital belongs to a 
foreign-based bank or financial group;11 
— Joint ventures, when there is equity 
participation by one or more foreign-capital 
enterprises (international, foreign, financial 
conglomerate or even another joint venture), 
with the respective percentage of control, side 
by side with at least one domestic and/or State 
enterprise or group with equal or greater par-
ticipation.12 
This subdivision allows us to distinguish, 
first of all, the affiliates of companies with 
headquarters outside the country —i.e., inter-
national and foreign companies— from those 
where the external control represents much 
more a financial contribution of capital, in the 
abstract sense, although it takes the form of 
direct investments. In the second place, this 
separation between international enterprises 
and foreign ones, based on the size of the 
parent company and on the degree of interna-
tional penetration, is an attempt to avoid con-
fusion between the large transnational corpora-
tions —usually called the transnationals— and 
enterprises with scant financial, technological 
and market power at the world level, which in 
some cases are only distinguished from domes-
tic corporations in that the control of capital 
belongs to a 'foreign resident'. In any case, the 
number of foreign enterprises thus defined, 
among the sector leaders in 1970, turned out to 
be fairly low, as was to be expected. 
n T h e higher base figure for participation in this case 
assumes less ease of control by the enterprises of this group 
than by industrial enterprises, specifically control of tech-
nology and patents, knowledge of and access to product 
markets, raw materials and equipment, marketing techni-
ques , etc. 
1 2 The inclusion of this category in the group of foreign 
capital enterprises is not strictly justified and only means 
that the enterprise in question is not under full domestic 
control. 
In fact, among the 272 foreign groups in-
cluded in the sample of the leading enterprises 
operating in Brazil, there are 114 groups with 
capital from the United States, 107 of which are 
affiliates of international enterprises; only 5 are 
foreign and 43 are controlled by financial con-
glomerates from the United States. Of the 159 
non-United States groups at the head of Brazi-
lian industry, the majority are of European 
origin, but only around half (84) are interna-
tional enterprises. The rest represent foreign 
enterprises (54) and financial conglomerates 
(24). 
The foreign enterprises entered the coun-
try more recently than the international ones, 
upon the diversification of the metal manufac-
tures and machinery, chemical and various 
instrument industries. The accelerated devel-
opment during this period opened up gaps in 
the market which were filled by smaller enter-
prises, with European and Japanese capital, as 
well as by small and medium-sized domestic 
industries which then expanded. 
The financial conglomerate enterprises 
are even more recent: most entered since May 
1968 as a result of the excess of liquidity in the 
Eurocurrency markets and the process of con-
glomeration of international financial capital. 
Mostly of European and Japanese origin, these 
groups are scattered over almost all the indus-
trial branches, the only exception being the 
case of rubber and tobacco, which are domi-
nated by two world cartels within which the 
markets of each important country are shared 
out. 
Market control was exercised predomi-
nantly through the operation of closed affiliates 
which followed the technological, commercial 
and financial policies of their respective head 
offices. That seemed to be the most effective 
method for large-scale international capital, 
since through parent company-affiliate opera-
tions they could carry on the well-known prac-
tices of transfer pricing, import- and export-
related policies, excessive diversification of 
products, technology, etc., whose most spec-
tacular and visible result was, up until very 
recently, the trade deficit. 
European and Japanese capital, which was 
less internationalized, used more flexible 
means of controlling the market with less par-
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ticipation of capital and sometimes even with-
out stockholder control, their control being 
basically exercised through technology and ex-
ternal indebtedness, taking advantage of less 
restrictive marketing practices. As a result 
inter-capitalistic competition sharpened even 
within the great oligopolies, and the position of 
some traditional cartels became less stable, in 
both the Brazilian and international markets. In 
any case, this was due not so much to the indus-
trial policies adopted by the host countries as to 
the increase in the international oligopolistic 
rivalry, which grew still further following the 
peak in the world cycle. In this stage, foreign 
capital, of all types and sources, intensified its 
efforts towards a rapid conquest of newly ex-
panding markets. On the domestic level, this 
movement gave rise to the accelerated repro-
duction of national capital, spontaneously in-
corporating into this process the growth of the 
small and medium-sized firms, especially in 
the metal manufactures and machinery in-
dustry. 
The available empirical evidence supports 
this assertion. Actually, in the period of rapid 
expansion from 1970 to 1973, no increase in the 
coefficients of concentration occurred, nor was 
there any accentuated denationalization of 
Brazilian industry. The growth rates of the 
large and small leading corporations were the 
same, and were identical to the average for 
processing industry. In addition, despite the 
growing internationalization of diverse mar-
kets, in this stage (which was completely fa-
vourable to the processes of fusion and associa-
tion of foreign capital with national groups) the 
take-overs were less important than the 
opening of new economic spaces, at least in 
respect of the leading enterprises. This ex-
plains why the large domestic corporations 
have not lost the leadership that they have tra-
ditionally exercised in some markets. 
2. Market leadership and competition strategy 
of international enterprises 
T h e Brazilian industrial structure shows some 
characteristic features in relation to the pres-
ence and leadership of international enter-
prises and to the division of spheres between 
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them and domestic public and private capital. 
In the durable consumer goods sector, the in-
ternational firms exercise almost absolute 
leadership; in the capital goods sector their 
presence is now decisive; while in the non-
durable consumer goods sector they exercise 
leadership in conjunction with the large do-
mestic enterprises, nevertheless dominating in 
the production of tobacco, pharmaceuticals, 
toiletries and some branches of the textile in-
dustry, clothing and food. In the basic inputs 
sector, such as heavy chemicals and metallur-
gy, they share domination with the State enter-
prises, and in the production of paper and pulp, 
non-metallic minerals and other branches of 
metallurgy, they exercise leadership along 
with domestic private capital enterprises. 
Moreover, they completely dominate the flat 
glass, rubber and electrical conductor indus-
tries, and are leaders in the dyes and paints, 
petrochemical materials, resins, pigments and 
colourings and plastic laminate industries. 
The degree of internationalization of pro-
duction in Brazilian industry may be gauged 
from the fact that only 29% of such production 
corresponds to sectors where there is exclusive 
leadership by domestic State or private enter-
prises. The State enterprises include iron and 
steel, fuels and lubricants, while the domestic 
ones include cement, some branches of cons-
truction materials and large sectors of the non-
durable consumer goods industry. 
This structural picture enables us to 
understand why the recent industrialization 
has been led by the growth strategy, the pat-
terns of production and the accumulation of 
capital of the international enterprises situated 
in the dynamic sectors producing durable con-
sumer goods, especially the automobile and 
related industries and electronics. In both 
cases these are concentrated and differentiated 
oligopolistic structures where practically 
closed affiliates of TNCs of various origins 
predominate. 
The automobile industry is composed of 
large, independent corporations which com-
pete aggressively in the international market 
and which see the Brazilian market as a plat-
form for the expansion and differentiation of 
markets and models. This industry shows 
growth rates of its productive capacity which 
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are greater than the growth of demand, and its 
profit margins are flexible in the face of lower 
sales. These strategies correspond to forms of 
rivalry between the leading enterprises and 
represent an attempt to conquer the new por-
tions of the market for which they are seriously 
competing. 
T h e electrical and electronic industry is 
dominated by a cartel of enterprises organized 
on a world scale with a clear division of areas 
and markets, and this explains why it responds 
less aggressively to the growth of the market. 
Its high rates of accumulation are more a re-
sponse to the rapid growth of the market itself 
than an attempt to win territory from rivals. 
Thus , it is more rigid in the face of the reduc-
tion of its profit margins and lower rates of 
accumulation when there is idle capacity. The 
dynamism of the automobile industry and the 
electrical and electronics industry is largely 
responsible for the rapid growth of new sectors 
(especially that of capital goods) which are fed 
by its derived demand. 
The presence of international enterprises 
in the heavy inputs industry is much less sig-
nificant, and this, except in the case of the 
recently modified legal oil monopoly, is not 
due to the existence of legal barriers. The logic 
of the Brazilian market alone, as it is histori-
cally structured, has prevented the entrance of 
new foreign affiliates in certain branches of 
strategic inputs. Among the central elements of 
this logic, there are two factors which are fun-
damental for the market strategy of the large 
enterprises: firstly, the impossibility of con-
trolling the market structure and final demand, 
which precludes the traditional monopolistic 
practices of selection of customers, control of 
sales and differentiation of the product; sec-
ondly, and increasingly important, the impos-
sibility of control or association in a backward 
direction towards the suppliers of equipment 
and technology, a normal TNC practice which 
would run up against the governmental policy 
of substitution of capital goods imports by 
buying from national producers. These struc-
tural e lements explain, more than does any 
tendency towards State control, the expansion 
of public enterprises in the basic inputs sectors. 
T h e oldest and most firmly established 
international groups are found in the non-
durable consumer goods markets. The mar-
kets concentrating on tobacco, toiletries and 
pharmaceutical products are traditionally in-
ternationalized, and in them the dominant en-
terprises exercise absolute control through 
marketing, brands, advertising and distribu-
tion. In the markets of deconcentrated produc-
tion, particularly the food industry, the control 
is exercised through the 'monopsonic' pur-
chase of raw materials and/or the marketing of 
production (milk, milk preparations, wheat 
milling, production and refining of vegetable 
oils, animal slaughtering and preparation of 
preserved meat). In all these branches, the 
internationalization of capital and production 
took place through the dominant presence of 
the United States affiliates, with the notable 
exception of one Swiss firm. In these cases it is 
a question of stable monopolistic situations, 
with a low relative growth rate" of demand and 
productive capacity. The progressive conquest 
of the regional markets has led to the formation 
of multi-plants when the local urban market 
justifies it, thus keeping the control of the na-
tional market in the hands of the dominant 
group. 
The only case of control by a stable oligo-
poly, with technical decentralization by multi-
plants but with high economic concentration, is 
that of beverages, whose market division be-
tween large national enterprises and some 
international ones in the carbonated beverages 
sector guarantees high profit margins to both. 
The growth of the sector as a whole is quite low, 
both in demand and in productive capacity, but 
at all events market control by the dominant 
firms allows a substantial raising of relative 
prices and maintenance of higher profit mar-
gins than the industry average, in a situation 
such that the performance of the leading estab-
lishments is not much different from the whole 
of the branch. 
In the textile, clothing and footwear indus-
tries, we have the important cases of leadership 
divided between domestic and foreign capital. 
Here , the opportunities for exports have stimu-
lated unstructured technological development 
and differentiation of products with a view to 
the stratification of regional, national and 
international markets. 
In the sectors of intermediate capital 
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goods, linked to the strategy of industrial ex-
pansion led by the automobile and electronics 
industries, we note the presence of the inter-
national corporations which most recently en-
tered the country; this is the case of the elec-
trical conductors, chemical raw materials, dyes 
and paint industries. An analogous phenome-
non occurred in the chemicals sectors related to 
the expansion of heavy chemicals and petro-
chemicals, in connexion with the pioneer in-
vestments by the State enterprises. Here, the 
situation of leadership by international oligo-
polies is still stable, and the market strategy 
emanates from the investment and final de-
mand policies of other public or international 
enterprises, through negotiations which result 
in a three-cornered interrelationship between 
State, foreign and domestic enterprises. 
In the case of capital goods, the relative 
participation of the international affiliates has 
risen since the last period of expansion in 1970-
1973. During these years their position in the 
group of leading establishments in the sector 
wen t from 69% to 75% of sales. This predomi-
nance reflects the control of the supply of 
equ ipment in two of the four sectors of this 
industry: electrical and electronic equipment 
and at least the main sectors producing ma-
chinery for cargo transport and handling, such 
as tractors, with parts and accessories, and 
earth-moving equipment. In the first sector, 
their leadership position was largely consoli-
dated by the total guarantee of orders on the 
part of the government, which accounted for 
almost all of the demand for heavy equipment 
produced by the large companies. The same 
occurred in the sectors producing heavy metal 
manufacturing machinery. Here, the division 
of markets be tween affiliates of international 
corporations and large domestic enterprises 
followed the guidelines imposed by the control 
of production technology. 
In the sectors of the capital goods industry 
which are still not 'cartelized', where there is a 
struggle between capital from various sources, 
including domestic capital and non-interna-
tionalized foreign capital, the leadership situa-
tion is still not defined. The adoption of'market 
reserve ' policies would not in itself guarantee 
the relative position of the domestic groups, 
even the most powerful, unless it were accom-
panied by an explicitly directed ordering strat-
egy. It is thus not a question of imposing 'en-
trance barriers', nor even of the traditional 
' import substitution', since almost all the sup-
pliers of equipment are already installed in the 
Brazilian market. The open oligopolistic com-
petition of the large-scale, non-internation-
alized foreign capital and the strongest domes-
tic capital will in no way aid in maintaining the 
portions of the market conquered or 'granted'. 
The most probable trend is towards the concen-
tration and centralization of capital in the hands 
of the large international groups which are 
moving towards the complete 'cartelization' of 
the market, in view of their greater power of 
internal pressure and external financing. 
3. Internationalization and external debt 
After the boom in the last growth cycle had 
passed, the fallacy of the 'island of prosperity', 
with which economic policy-makers claimed to 
present the Brazilian situation, also disap-
peared. T h e link between the Brazilian econ-
omy and the capitalistic system in crisis could 
no longer be hidden by waving a magic wand, 
and in a certain way the solution for the former 
involved solutions for the problems faced by 
the latter, too. Let us reconsider here some 
arguments dealt with at the beginning of this 
essay, in order to explain the trends towards 
internationalization of capital in Brazil. 
Around 1973-1974 it began to be evident 
that the great boom in post-war capitalist ex-
pansion had come to an end. Two symptoms 
made this clear: the dollar crisis and the oil 
crisis. The first signalled the breakdown of the 
United States hegemony and the second was a 
menace hanging over the entire industrial 
structure of the capitalist world, which was 
built on the three legs of the tripod: the pe-
troleum industry and its derivatives, automo-
biles and the highway system. The resistance 
to collapse shown by the large international 
enterprises was due to their desperate attempts 
to maintain their privileged positions in the 
various markets, using their monopolistic 
power to raise prices on a world scale and 
permit a speculative spiral of the money, com-
modities and land markets. 
Thus the phenomena which reveal the end 
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of the great boom of industrial capitalism have 
materialized in this general crisis, in the speci-
fic manner in which the monetary system, basic 
raw materials and land are seen to constitute 
the three pillars of the speculative springboard 
which is precipitating the world economy into 
a situation of slow fragmentation, destruction 
and formation of blocs which are fighting 
among themselves for their relative positions 
without showing any inclination to yield. 
Brazil is deep within this movement of 
sharpened competition between the great blocs 
of internationalized capital. Thus, after a mu-
tually advantageous coexistence between the 
oligopolistic rivalries which reinforced the 
simultaneous expansion of the productive and 
market capacities, we seem now to be ap-
proaching a critical point in non-peaceful 'co-
existence' be tween capital blocs of diverse 
origin. The rivalry between these blocs mani-
fests itself in various ways. The most important 
weapons in this struggle are privileged access 
to national and international credit and the 
capacity to capture regional markets outside of 
Brazil through an aggressive policy of indus-
trial exports of products with absolute advan-
tages. These latter derive both from the policy 
of implicit or explicit subsidies granted by the 
Brazilian economic policy and from the fact 
that they are made at marginal cost on the basis 
of considerable scales of production for the 
internal market. The rate of industrial expan-
sion has been kept fairly high by international 
standards, so that the dilemma between the 
external and internal markets has not yet 
arisen. In fact, the affiliates have used the 
obvious advantages of complementarity which 
exist in the joint expansion of both markets. 
T h e efforts of the affiliates to export have 
mainly been oriented towards the Latin Ameri-
can and African markets, but also include the 
socialist countries and developed capitalist 
countries where the affiliates can open gaps in 
the unconsolidated market of their rivals. 
Recent studies on the exports of the largest 
international corporations reveal that the trend 
towards a trade deficit of the principal affiliates 
has been reversed as a result of the worsening 
of the overall situation of the Brazilian balance 
of payments and the international crisis itself, 
which have led to an export effort made neces-
sary both by Brazilian domestic policy and by 
the increase in intercapitalistic competition. 
After the tapering-off of the cyclical boom, 
the accumulation by international corporations 
in the country lost momentum and overall in-
debtedness became especially concentrated in 
the State enterprises, which resorted to it be-
cause of decisions by the government to fi-
nance its deficit position in foreign currency 
rather than for reasons to do with domestic ac-
cumulation by these enterprises themselves. 
T h e Central Bank's report for 1978 shows that 
on 31 December of that year the public sector 
was responsible for 63.3% of the external debt 
recorded: an increase over the previous year, 
when the figure was 60.3%. 
The external debt represents one of the 
most perverse factors of the process of inter-
nationalization of the Brazilian economy, since 
its growth since 1976 is absolutely sterile in 
real terms. It does not correspond, whatever 
the concept used, to so-called 'external 
savings', since it coincides with the decelera-
tion of the investment rate and with a fall in the 
demand for imports of capital goods and com-
plementary inputs for domestic production. In 
other words, the external debt has become ster-
ile from the point of view of the need for im-
ports, and accumulative from the financial 
point of view. 
The external financial debt of Brazil con-
tracted in recent years may be considered 
overall as a 'fictitious' mechanism for accu-
mulating financial capital to permit the transfer 
of profits to international bankers who invest 
their excess 'international liquidity' here. What 
has caused this transfer is the difference be-
tween the domestic and external interest rates, 
which has made the Brazilian financial market 
attractive. This mechanism may be considered 
'fictitious' because it derives from an ac-
counting game which arose with the conver-
sion of the cruzeiro, permanently over-valued 
in relation to the international monetary sys-
tem. In turn, this was brought about as a result 
of the 'manipulation' of the exchange rate and 
the monetary correction of public debt securi-
ties, which act as a new form of domestic 'fi-
nancial money'. Public debt securities, espe-
cially treasury notes, were used during the first 
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stage (1971-1974) as a monetary policy instru-
ment to counteract the expansion of the means 
of payment derived from the money indebted-
ness abroad, but in a second stage, after 1975, it 
accelerated more than the external debt due to 
the movement of speculative financial circula-
tion which has occurred since then. 
Part of the external debt figures as a 'forced 
debt ' of the government, since as the cruzeiro is 
not a convertible money, the Brazilian State 
needs to finance its debtor position in the in-
ternational market with foreign currency. The 
quest ion of why the government did not try 
sooner to renegotiate the debt and chose to 
serve it by indebtedness which was increasing-
ly greater than necessary remains unanswered. 
T h e idea that this process, which results in a 
considerable increase in reserves, could be 
used as 'an emergency safeguard' in any poten-
tial crisis in the international financial market 
is inconsistent with the increase in the already 
very heavy financial burden of the debt, which 
represents a game of blind man's bluff with the 
future. T h e pressure presently being exerted 
by international bankers for Brazil to submit to 
the rules of the International Monetary Fund 
may even mean that the future has already 
arrived. 
The other part of the external debt is that 
which is contracted either directly by the 
enterprises, through Law No. 4131, or through 
the intermediation of financial institutions in 
accordance with Resolution No. 63. In this case 
the increased indebtedness is due not only to 
the short-term interests of the international 
bankers, always eager to find a profitable ap-
plication for the excess money that they them-
selves help to create with their speculative 
movements in the principal financial markets 
of the world; it is also due to the interests of the 
Brazilian affiliates of the international corpora-
tions and of the national banking system. 
While the difference between internal and 
external interest rates represents only an 
accounting transfer backed by the issuing 
power of the government, the internal differ-
ence between the cost of money taken external-
ly and its remuneration in domestic applica-
tions represents a real transfer of incomes of 
wage-earners, small and medium-sized enter-
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prises, and even large domestic enterprises 
showing a deficit, which cannot resort to the 
mechanism of direct indebtedness with the 
exterior. From the point of view of the profits of 
the capitalist class as a whole, this transfer is 
only a redistribution in favour of the financially 
strongest sectors. However, from the point of 
view of the workers, it is a real loss of income, 
since financial speculation pushes the inflation 
rate above the prices desired by the large cor-
porations and used as an element in calculating 
their gross margins of profit. 
The difference in interest rates resulting 
from the international exchange of currencies, 
when one of them is non-convertible —that is, 
without international exchange value— cannot 
b e paid in effective terms since there is no trade 
surplus. Even the transfer price mechanisms 
are incapable of transferring the real surplus to 
the exterior; they can only move an accounting 
surplus. The difference in interest rates is paid, 
from the accounting point of view, through the 
State's power of regulation over the exchange 
rate and over the sale of securities issued by the 
State itself. That is to say, it is 'socialized' in a 
way which represents only a growing indeb-
tedness on the part of the State, both internally 
and externally, which will have to be resolved 
in the future (perhaps sooner than imagined) by 
its internal power of arbitration and its political 
power of international negotiation, which are 
contradictory because they represent great op-
posing interests. 
4. Recent trends and prospect of 
internationalization in Brazil 
There are various foreseeable trends as regards 
the restructuring of control of the market by the 
vari ou s groups in the Brazilian industrial struc-
ture. Various situations may occur, from a new 
wave of 'cartelization' and sharing-out of the 
market among the large competing interna-
tional enterprises, to an increase in the central-
ization of large capital through take-overs of 
private capital from smaller domestic or foreign 
sources. Control of finance and the market, 
much more than technology, seems to be the 
strategic factor in this stage of relative interna-
tional stagnation, when the main technological 
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innovations have already become widely dif-
fused.13 
At the same time, however, we should not 
set aside the more optimistic hypothesis of a 
partial 'renational i zation' of some international 
enterprises in sectors where, oppressed by 
competit ion and by a possible alternative eco-
nomic policy, they find conditions relatively 
more favourable for reviewing their rigid con-
trol practices and for trying to relocate them-
selves, in association with national capitals, in a 
large market with good prospects for long-term 
expansion. However, in the short term the 
t rends towards internationalization will still 
predominate . 
There are two sectors in particular which 
will be closely watched by the large interna-
tional corporations during this period of shar-
pen ing competition between oligopolies at the 
world level: mineral resources and banking. As 
regards mineral resources, foreign capital is 
concentrating its attention on iron ore and 
strategic minerals. In relation to the first, the 
four largest enterprises, after the Companhia 
Vale do Rio Doce, are affiliates of international 
corporations or are associated with foreign capi-
tal. A study carried out by the economist Paulo 
César Sá and published in Boletim do IERJ 
(Instituto dos Economistas do Rio de Janeiro), 
reveals that "of the most important foreign in-
vestments in the mining sector, five are related 
to the export of iron ore (Consorcio MBR, 
Futeco, Samarco, Samitri and H. Muller) and 
are l inked with large iron and steal groups, 
whi le the others are connected with manga-
nese (Icomi), gold (Anglo-American), niobium 
(CBMM) and cassiterite (Brascan). In non-
metallic minerals, the most important is 
the Lafarge Association, Lonestar while the 
Hochschild group is also engaged in various 
activities".14 
In broad terms, State capital has been con-
centrating in the areas of iron ore and energy 
13\Ve refer to innovations in the Schumpeterian sense 
of the introduction of new ways of producing or differenti-
ating products and controlling the markets, that is to say, 
new ways of practicing intercapital istic competition, and 
not to the world-wide advancement of'technical progress', 
already achieved or in the process of development. 
1 4 P. C. Sá, "A política mineral brasileira", Boletim do 
IERJ, No. 17, January-February 1981. 
minerals, while domestic private capital has 
been concentrating in non-metallic minerals 
related to civil construction and non-ferrous 
minerals. The pressures exercised by interna-
tional groups with a view to taking control of 
certain mineral regions began to meet with re-
sistance from the Brazilian State, more for rea-
sons of national security, linked with the esprit 
de corps oí the military fraternity, than for any 
other motive. 
As regards the banking sector, two very 
different types of reasons were active here. The 
domestic capital was already in fact firmly in-
stalled in its market positions before the begin-
ning of the international expansion after the 
war and the formation of the large 'trans-
national ' banks, with the consequent im-
plantation of affiliates in the various countries. 
Thus, and with the support (explicit or not) of 
the Central Bank, it maintained its predomi-
nance and had sufficient strength even to 
surmount certain 'liberalizing' measures. 
In reality, in no text are 'entrance barriers' 
of a legal nature mentioned, except those 
contained in Law No. 4131 of 3 October 1962, 
article 50 of which establishes that foreign 
banks authorized to operate in Brazil should be 
subject to the same prohibitions or restrictions 
imposed by their countries of origin on Bra-
zilian banks; moreover, foreign banks from 
countries where there are restrictions on the 
operation of Brazilian banks will be unable to 
acquire more than 30% of the voting stock of 
Brazilian banks. This text is the only written 
regulation existing in the 1946 Constitution 
(and successive ones), which did not adopt any 
other restrictive measures on the activities of 
foreign banking establishments. 
However, in spite of the 'liberalism' of 
the legislation, the increase in the number of 
foreign banks was relatively small. In 1948 
there were ten foreign establishments in-
stalled in the country: Bank of London and 
South America, Banco Nacional Ultramarino, 
the National City Bank of New York, Banco 
Italo-Belga, The Royal Bank of Canada, Banco 
Holandês Unido, The First National Bank 
of Boston, Crédit Foncier du Brésil et de 
l 'Amérique du Sud and Caisse Générale de 
Prêts Fonciers et Industriaux. 
In 1976 there were 19 foreign commercial 
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banks, of which only 5 had already been 
established in 1948: Bank of London and South 
America, City Bank, Banco Europeu para a 
América Latina (new name for the Banco Italo-
Belga), Banco Holandês Unido, and Bank of 
Boston; the Royal Bank of Canada was still 
present in the Brazilian banking system, but 
was associated now with the Bank of America 
as Banco Internacional. Another two had al-
ready operated in the country but their authori-
zation had been cancelled in 1942 as a result of 
Brazil's declaration of war against the Axis: the 
Banco Alemão Transatlântico and the Banco 
Frances e Italiano para a América do Sul; the 
Deutsch Sudamerikanische Bank, which today 
has minority participation in the Banco Lar 
Brasileiro, controlled by the Chase Manhattan 
Bank, could also be included in this category. 
Among the others are the recently arrived Japa-
nese banks (Mitsubishi, Tokyo and Sumitomo) 
and those which are only representative offices 
of foreign public or private banks such as Banco 
de la Nación Argentina, Banca Commerciale 
Italiana, Agencia Financial do Portugal and 
the Unión de Bancos del Uruguay, Español, 
Territorial y del Norte. Finally we have the 
Banco Cidade de São Paulo, owned by the 
Swiss Bank Corporation; the Banco Francês e 
Brasileiro associated with Crédit Lyonnais, 
and the Banco América do Sul, the only one 
which, though a foreign bank (controlled by the 
Japanese Fuji group), has less than 30% of its 
capital stock in the hands of residents outside 
the country. 
Few of these institutions have much im-
portance in the ranking of Brazilian commer-
cial banks, the most important being the City 
Bank, the Francês e Brasileiro, the América 
do Sul, the Lar Brasileiro and the Francês e 
Italiano. Actually, the group of foreign banks 
represents 18% of the total number of commer-
cial banks operating in the country, but they are 
responsible for only 13% of the loans and 12% 
of the demand deposits.15 This may be 
explained by the unwritten rules imposed by 
the Banco Central, which restrict the opening 
of agencies on the part of foreign banks; so 
1 5 These data correspond to 1976 and were compiled 
from the Boletim do Banco Central and the Revista 
Bancária. 
much so that i fwe consider the total number of 
bank branches in the country (headquarters, 
agencies and subagencies) the share of the 
foreign banks drops to less than 1%. 
Not all of the foreign banks operating in the 
country may be considered internationals (or 
transnationals) stricto sensu. However, in this 
sector there has been much pressure in recent 
years towards greater 'openness': the estab-
lishment of the 'Rio-dollar' seems to have been 
only a trial balloon with a view to developing a 
temporary statute which would allow a great-
number of large 'transnational' banks to enter, 
operating directly with their fictitious money, 
the dollar which they themselves issue, The 
big domestic banking capital was able to op-
pose these measures directly, as in the case 
of the 'Rio-dollar', or indirectly through its 
dissuasive power and its ties with the State 
apparatus, as in the case of certain aspects 
of the banking reform law and of the capital 
market. In these texts there were provisions 
which stimulated association with the big 
transnational banks, either for the differentia-
tion and specialization of financial institutions 
or in order to facilitate the procurement of 
foreign resources in line with the means pro-
vided by Resolution No. 63 of the Banco Cen-
tral.16 Despite the growth in the participation of 
foreign capital (especially when the financial 
system is considered as a whole, including 
banking and non-banking institutions), the 
large-scale domestic capital promoted the 
t rend toward conglomeration and maintained 
its predominance and leadership in the sector. 
The future of internationalization in the 
financial (and banking) sector has yet to be 
decided. And the end of the story will not 
depend on the domestic capacity for political 
resistance and negotiation with the State on the 
part of the Brazilian bankers alone, but on the 
possibility of seeking a new connexion with the 
productive sectors and on the evolution of the 
international crisis itself and its effects on the 
Brazilian economy. In any case, this was the 
sector which benefitted most from the recent 
l f iUnder Resolution No. 63, financial institutions may 
obtain resources in the international financial market and 
transfer them to the Brazilian market over shorter tenus and 
at lower values. 
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development of capitalism in Brazil, and par-
ticularly from the policies of internal and ex-
ternal indebtedness. The sector has not shown 
a propensity to assume the historical role of 
'financial capital' (in Hilferding's sense); 
it centralizes capital and promotes national 
heavy industry, but in relation to speculative 
international banking capital it prefers a posi-
tion of tacit alliance. However, the possibilities 
that this situation may persist are no longer the 
same, and the national banking capital will 
soon be brought face to face with the choices it 
has been avoiding. 
